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WELFARE REGIMES AND SOCIAL COHESION REGIMES: DO THEY 
EXPRESS THE SAME VALUES1? 
 
ABSTRACT 
Welfare regime types are classified according to the role played by three 
main institutions, namely the market, the state and the family. They can be 
reinterpreted as systems of exchanges for providing resources based on 
the main principles of liberty, equality and solidarity. Depending on the 
different possible dialectical relations between these three principles, they 
lead to different social cohesion regimes.  
This paper is the first attempt to empirically test this hypothesis at European 
level by elaborating a measure of social cohesion based on values and 
creating a typology of social cohesion regimes. In comparison to welfare 
regimes, it invites to go one step further by considering the articulation 
between the three main principles and proposes a more precise 
classification for countries. The results invite further research on the links 
between welfare and social cohesion regimes. The analysis is based on 
data from the 2008 European Values Study (EVS) in 43 countries using 
principal component analysis, multidimensional scaling and cluster 
analyses.  
  
                                                          
1 We recognize the significant contribution to this article by our late colleague, Paul Dickes. Had it 
not been for his untimely death in May 2012, Paul would probably have been the first author. 
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1. Introduction  
Social cohesion is the main topic addressed by each society as being the 
most fundamental value of all societies. The origin of the concept is to be 
found in Durkheim (1893), in his work “Division of Labour in Society”, in 
which he closely linked social cohesion to social solidarity and to collective 
consciousness.  
Since the 1990s, the question of social cohesion has encountered a revival. 
At the political level, it is usually addressed to deplore its dissolution, based 
on the accumulation of a wide variety of juxtaposed indicators (World Bank, 
OECD, European Council, and European Commission). At the academic 
level, it also exhibits a large diversity of definitions and measures (Maxwell 
1996, Gough and Olofsson 1999, Friedkin 2004, Bruhn 2009, Wietzke 2015) 
but most of the authors agree on its multidimensional characteristics 
(Jenson 1998, Berger 1998, Kearns and Forrest 2000, Chan et al. 2006, 
Rajulton et al. 2007). 
A more comprehensive definition is provided by Bernard (1999) who 
postulates that welfare state regimes are tools for achieving and maintaining 
social cohesion. He considers welfare state regimes as historical 
compromises around the main principles of liberty, equality and solidarity. 
These three values, originating with the Enlightenment, represent the 
fundaments of democracy; they are related to each other, form a totality 
and, at the same time, contradict each other. From this permanent legal and 
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normative negotiation or “dialectic of democracy” emerge specific types of 
social cohesion.  
Liberal welfare states give priority to the market and promote limited state 
intervention and family solidarity, while putting (economic) liberty first. 
Conservative/corporatist welfare states give priority to the family and 
occupational categories over both market and state intervention and 
promote solidarity (between groups based on professional or family ties). 
Finally, social-democratic welfare states give priority to the state in order to 
reduce the dependency of individuals on both market and family, thus 
favouring equality. 
To what extent do current individual values still correspond to these 
historical compromises? Is it possible to distinguish welfare state regimes 
on the basis of individual support to these main principles? In other words, 
do we find a concordance between the underpinning values of welfare 
regimes and the current values of the population? To answer this question 
allows to know to what extent social cohesion regimes are congruent with 
the typology of the usual welfare states, and not only to formulate 
hypotheses on their development but also to anticipate national answers 
towards welfare policy and towards the development of a free market policy.  
This paper aims 1) to elaborate a measure of social cohesion on the basis 
of values that can be applied in any democratic framework 2) to test it at 
European level by creating a typology of social cohesion regimes and 3) to 
address the adequacy of the welfare regime by comparing these two 
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typologies and testing how far the underpinning values overlap. It is the first 
attempt to contribute to both debates on social cohesion and the welfare 
state by empirically testing a) the operationalisation of a democratic 
definition of social cohesion, and b) the link between social cohesion and 
welfare states.   
This paper is structured as follows. The first part consists of a brief 
discussion of the typology of welfare state regimes in European countries 
and presents some theoretical considerations on values and how to 
measure them, with a specific focus to the underlying values of social 
cohesion. The second part presents a methodology for measuring values 
and its application to micro data. The third part presents the results in two 
sub-sections; firstly, an empirical validation based on EVS data and 
secondly, a typology of social cohesion which is compared to that of welfare 
state regimes developed using the Esping-Andersen perspective. In the 
final part, we conclude and discuss the results.  
2. Welfare states, values and social cohesion 
2.1 The Esping-Andersen typology and its extension 
In his typology based on the role played by the market, state and family, 
Esping-Andersen identifies three main welfare state regime types in western 
societies: liberal, conservative/corporative and social democratic. This 
typology has been widely discussed2, particularly in relation to its possible 
                                                          




broadening to include further types, the classification of Central European 
countries and finally its resilience in the contemporary world.   
One of the issues it has raised concerns the presence of a fourth regime: 
the Latin/Mediterranean type. For some observers (Leibfried 1992; 
Petmesidou 1996; Ferrera 19963), it is not possible to classify southern 
European countries as simply a variant of the conservative/corporative 
regime as proposed by Esping-Andersen, because of their underdeveloped 
state provision, strong familialism, extreme fragmentation of the social 
security system, large gaps in social protection and selective distribution of 
benefits through clientelism. According to St-Arnaud and Bernard (2003), 
the Mediterranean model is more familialist than the 
corporatist/conservative one; programmes with redistributive and social 
safety net goals are less generous; and market performance is limited by 
labour market rigidities. 
A second important issue concerns the Central and Eastern 
European countries. The fall of communist regimes raised the issue of how 
to qualify these new welfare states, the relevance of the Esping-Andersen 
typology being at the core of discussion. Some commentators argued that 
this typology was appropriate for the classification of Central and Eastern 
European countries, claiming that the differences between these countries 
and the regimes included in the related typology were only temporary 
(Abrahamson 1999; Esping-Andersen 1996; Deacon 1993, 1992). Others 
                                                          




maintained this typology was clearly inadequate for classifying Central and 
Eastern European countries, as they would preserve some important 
particularities of their recent history over the long term (Aidukaite 2009). In 
opposition to this, Ferge (2008) argues that these countries do not constitute 
a bloc in terms of culture, as their welfare culture has deeper roots than the 
period of the totalitarian system.  
A third significant issue is that of the ongoing congruence between 
the Esping-Andersen typology elaborated during the ‘Golden Age of welfare 
state expansion’ (Taylor-Gooby 2010: 37) and current welfare regimes. 
Analysing this temporal aspect, Danforth (2014) points out that Esping-
Andersen elaborated his typology using cross-sectional data from 1980. 
Using data from 1950 to 2000 in 5-year intervals for 18 advanced capitalist 
democracies, Danforth finds the “tripartite typology” to be valid only for the 
period 1975 to 1985.  
Finally, as several commentators have observed, globalisation and 
the financialisation of economics have severely shaken the welfare regime 
of many states. In Europe, this has been accentuated by the European 
Monetary Union and European Union, which have had a significant impact 
on national budgets and social policies. The Lisbon Strategy (2000-2010) 
and its related social agenda, proposed common political and economic 
measures to reach shared social objectives in which full employment is at 
the core of the system. Thus the welfare system of each country has evolved 





2.2 The welfare state as a mediator of social cohesion 
The two main models of welfare states, the Bismarckian and the 
Beveridgian models, have the same objective of social cohesion, or keeping 
social order, but are rooted in two different ideologies. The first one stems 
from the end of the nineteenth century, focused on risks (sickness, 
accidents, aging, and invalidity) and was based on work-insurance. During 
this period of industrial development, the political objective was to regulate 
the proletariat and to stop socialist movements by developing social laws as 
well as sharing the benefits of economic growth.  
The Beveridgian model was developed in Britain following the so-called 
report on “Social Insurance and Allied Services” from Beveridge in 1942 
which pleaded for a restructuration of the current system. The political 
objective was to call for national unity during and after World War II 
(Kerschen 1995). This model was mostly applied in Nordic and Southern 
European countries, focused on basic needs, and was based on assistance 
to all citizens. It is usually defined by unity, universality, and uniformity 
(Rothstein 2002).  
Despite these different underlying ideologies, one of the main 
objectives of social security is to maintain social cohesion (Berghman and 
Verhalle 2002, Saint-Arnaud and Bernard 2003). Bernard considers this to 
be a permanently renegotiated balance between the three main, which are 
liberty, equality, and solidarity. As they are very basic values, they are 
9 
 
considered to be universal values (Haller, 2002). These values have 
contradictory relations: too great a focus on liberty leads to polarisation and 
community dislocation; too great an accent on equality leads to 
totalitarianism and disengagement; too great an emphasis on solidarity 
leads to regimentation and domination. To achieve and maintain social 
cohesion, the state has to constantly find a balance between these three 
main elements.  
Simultaneously, there is permanent interaction between values and 
institutions – i.e. between institutionalised values and the welfare state 
regime – which leads to a process of change that affects both. Values 
change with changing circumstances and also through generational 
replacement (Inglehart 1990). Welfare regimes are the results of historical 
compromises, and “depending on the historical ‘age’ of a nation state and 
its size, huge differences exist” (Haller 2002:154). These considerations 
should guard us against any essentialist interpretation based on analysing 
values of social cohesion.  
Next to values, Bernard proposes to take into consideration the 
concrete dimensions of social cohesion, that is, the manifestation of these 
three mobilising values in attitudes and behaviours. Ignoring the role of 
values, Saint-Arnaud and Bernard (2003) validate the typology of Esping-
Andersen, the identification of a Mediterranean welfare regime (Leibfried 
1992, Ferrera 1996, Bonoli 1997) and the fact that European societies were 
still taking different paths to fostering social cohesion in the 1990s. Fenger 
(2007) extends this analysis to Central and Eastern European countries. He 
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confirms the three welfare types (with no specific regime for Southern 
European countries), and identifies three further regimes, specific to the 
Eastern and Central European countries. The first, which he calls “post-
soviet”, includes Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine. It 
is characterised by a lower level of social protection than in Northern and 
Western European countries, as well as higher inequalities and 
unemployment rates. The second groups together Hungary, Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Bulgaria and Croatia, and is similar to the post-
soviet model, but has a higher level of social protection and a lower level of 
inequality. The last model characterises countries with the least developed 
welfare states, such as Georgia, Romania and Moldavia, and is called “in-
development countries”. 
Bernard’s theory of social cohesion (1999) has been partially 
validated by Dickes et al. (2010), who consider social cohesion as a 
multidimensional concept. They create a measure of attitudes and 
behaviours applied to the European Values Study of 1999, conducted in 33 
European countries. However, the major role that Bernard assigned to 
values in defining social cohesion is not taken into account. A substantial 
contribution to this question is the work of Green and his collaborators 
(2009), who elaborate a typology of a social cohesion regime and propose 
a definition of social cohesion based on political and philosophical 
judgments. More specifically, taking into account different indicators linked 
to social situation, state interventionism, social and political participation and 
adhesion to values, they identify three social cohesion regimes that overlap 
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the Esping-Andersen typology. In terms of values, they observe a strong 
adhesion to liberal and meritocratic values in liberal societies, with a weak 
valorisation of equality. Social-democratic societies, like liberal societies, 
adhere strongly to liberal values, but, unlike them, display a weak regard for 
meritocratic values. Curiously, and contrary to Bernard’s expectations, 
equality is weakly valued in this kind of regime. This shift towards economic 
liberalism in Nordic countries is also observed by Chenu and Herpin (2006). 
Corporatist societies, named the “social market regime” by Green et al., pay 
the highest regard to equality. They also strongly adhere to meritocratic 
values and only weakly to liberal ones. 
Unfortunately, Green et al. did not take into account the third 
dimension of Bernard’s scheme, which is solidarity. Similarly, they did not 
include Central and Eastern European countries in their analyses. In this 
paper, therefore, we aim to measure adhesion to the values of liberty, 
equality and solidarity in the 47 European countries, using the European 
Values Study 2008, to identify social cohesion regimes on the basis of these 
three values, and to verify to what extent these regimes overlap with the 
typologies developed from the Esping-Andersen perspective. Thus, 
countries will be classified on the basis of the main principles currently 
supported by their residents and not according to geographical or historical 
criteria.  
 
3. Measures and methods 
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Analyses are based on the European Values Study of 2008 (EVS). The data 
set is representative of the population aged 18 and over. For methodological 
reasons, we excluded four countries from our sample (Azerbaijan, Kosovo, 
Northern Ireland and Turkey). The original weighted pooled sample 
consisted of 43 countries and 61,796 individuals. To ensure equal weighting 
in the analyses the number of cases has been adjusted to 1,000 in each 
country. 
Values are defined following the definition elaborated by Levy and 
Guttman (1985), which takes into account their multi-faceted nature. 
Following this definition and the presentation of the theoretical scheme of 
Bernard, we identify 11 items which are used to measure liberty, equality 
and solidarity in all countries. For each item, missing data varies between 2 
and 11%. Thus missing values were handled by Multiple Correspondence 
Analysis and imputed according to the application of Optimal scaling (Gifi, 
1990). The polarity of scales was harmonised so that all scales indicate the 
same direction. 
 The five items selected for liberty are specifically related to the 
economic domain, as Bernard’s theory argued. In this context, liberty has to 
be understood as the promotion of individual responsibility, competition and 
freedom of entrepreneurial activity. This leads to an opposition between 
those who are in favour of the free market and those who are more in favour 
of the intervention of the State in the economy (see table 1).   
In Bernard’s view, equality can be understood as equality of outcome 
or equality of opportunity. The first is a vision of social justice linked to the 
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reduction of high income inequality between individuals. The second is a 
compromise between a guarantee of basic needs for all and the recognition 
of individual merits and efforts. In both cases, Bernard considers the state 
as an instrument for promoting equality. The EVS questionnaire does not 
contain common items for measuring equality of opportunity. Therefore, we 
selected two items linked to equality of outcome.  
 
TABLE 1.  
   [here] 
The four indicators illustrating solidarity are limited to family solidarity; 
they are related to filial love and the feelings of family responsibility and 
intergenerational support between parents and children. The first argument 
for this choice is an empirical one, as the EVS does not allow for the 
measurement of civil solidarity as it could be understood in Bernard’s 
scheme. The second one is a theoretical one, as family solidarity is the key 
to distinguishing between the different types of social cohesion. Esping-
Andersen (1990) identifies family as one of the major pillars of welfare state 
regimes. In this respect, Masson (2009: 101) goes further, claiming that 
“family and intergenerational solidarity represent the conceptual divide 
between the three visions of welfare state”. Other research evidenced that 
strong family ties imply more reliance on the family as an economic unit that 
provides goods and services and less on the market and on the state for 
social insurance (Alesina and Giuliano 2007). On the other side, we observe 
that the “modernisation” of social security, which involves a reduction of 
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rights and the shorter duration of benefits, reallocates a main role to family 
support.   
To test our theory, we used principal component analysis (PCA) to 
identify the structure of the selected items at individual level. We tested for 
internal consistency (Cronbach alpha coefficient) of the construct on all 
individuals. 
 Invariance of the theoretical constructs across countries was tested 
using multidimensional scaling (MDS) which enables the testing of facet 
theories (Canter 1985). This method “represents measurement of similarity 
(or dissimilarity) among pairs of objects as distances between points of a 
low-dimensional multidimensional space” (Borg and Groenen 2005: 3). The 
specific procedure of multidimensional scaling of individual differences 
(INDSCAL) or weighted MDS (Carrol and Chang 1970) includes group 
differences. It enables testing of the structural invariance of significance of 
the three values of social cohesion between countries, taking into account 
the structure common to all countries as well as each one of them (Kruskal 
and Wish 1978; Coxon 1982; Tournois and Dickes 1993). 
 In a final step, we conducted a hierarchical cluster analysis to 
develop our typology of social cohesion regimes. Similar population profiles 
are grouped according to the importance they attribute to values. This 
method “is the most appropriate […] because it allows grouping countries 
that have similar characteristics across a set of variables, thus leading to 
homogeneous empirical types” (Saint-Arnaud and Bernard 2003).  
4. Results  
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Conducting a PCA analysis with varimax rotation on the eleven items, we 
refer to Cattell’s scree test (Cattell 1966) and identify three components 
which explain 46% of the total observed variance (Table 2). The three 
identified factors express the three values of social cohesion identified by 
Bernard in his theory. 
TABLE 2.  
[here] 
 
4.1 Empirical validation at European level 
The MDS PROXSCAL procedure was applied to the eleven items in the 43 
countries. The outcomes suggest that a solution with two dimensions is 
sufficient to interpret the results. The common space is represented in figure 
1 and shows a radex structure. Items belonging to the same component are 
grouped in three regions of the common space. The three regions 
correspond to the three components of the PCA.  
Figure 1.4  
[here] 
Analysis of measurement equivalence was completed with a weighted 
MDS model which confirms that the common structure is similar in each of 
the 43 countries. This evaluation is done to complete the analysis by 
                                                          
4 Stress and model fit diagnostics: Normalized Raw Stress: 0,029; Stress-I Kruskal: 0.171; 
dispersion: 0.971; Tucker's Coefficient of Congruence (correlation): 0.985. 
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analysing the weight of each country within the common space. In figure 2, 
we observe one group of countries expressing their attraction towards the 
two dimensions of the common space.  
Observing the mean stress of all items for each country, we see that it 
is much higher for ten countries, showing that the structure does not 
correspond to the one expected on the basis of theory alone. We examined 
MDS in detail for these ten countries, which are Armenia, Georgia, 
Romania, Latvia, Moldova, Portugal, Northern Cyprus, Hungary, Lithuania 
and Cyprus. For these countries, with the exception of Moldova, Hungary 
and Lithuania, the item “income should be more equal” (equal02) should be 
in one space with “equality is more important than liberty” (equal01) but it 
figures in the same space as economic liberty. The significance attributed 
to income scale (equal02) in these seven countries is quite different from 
the others. The item measuring social equality (equal01) seems to capture 
better the dimension of equality (Gundelach 2014). 
Observing the mean stress by item for all countries, we see that it 
differs from one item to another. The item equal02 which is composed of a 
scale of income equality is not sufficiently adjusted to the common 
configuration. The mean stress of the item is equal to 0.061 while the total 
mean stress is equal to 0.029. The item equal01 provides a better measure 
of equality. The items for the two other constructs (economic liberty and 
familial solidarity) are more reliable, and seem to receive a common 
interpretation in all countries.  
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Figure 2.  
[here] 
 
Lastly, we tested cross-countries invariance measures by estimating 
internal consistency of the items with the Cronbach-alpha coefficient, which 
depends on mean correlations between items and on the number of items. 
It gives the lower limit of the fidelity of items collected to measure the 
construct and varies between 0 and 1. The higher the value, the more 
consistent is the construct.  
The internal consistency of the construct formed by the two items of 
equality is relatively weak, as the estimation is not consistent across most 
of the countries. We therefore measure equality with the single item equal01 
for egalitarian value. The construct of economic liberty is measured by five 
items with a Cronbach alpha of 0.625 for the whole dataset, while the 
construct of familial solidarity is measured by four items with a Cronbach 
alpha of 0.602 for the whole dataset (Table 3). We have standardised the 
scores of these items and added them to create two composite indicators. 
TABLE 3.  
[here] 
 
We succeeded in obtaining a reliable measure of economic liberty and 
familial solidarity. In comparison, the measure of equality may be 
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considered as weak, which confirms the statement by Green et al. (2009) 
that EVS has a poor measure of equality. 
4.2 A typology of social cohesion regimes 
To identify a typology of social cohesion regimes based on the three values, 
we proceeded with a hierarchical analysis classification using Ward's 
minimum variance method, which minimises variance in clusters and 
maximises their homogeneity. With reference to the hierarchical tree, we 
kept a solution with 6 clusters. All correlations between variables and groups 
were highly significant (Fisher-Snedecor’s F), and the explained variance is 
between 70% and 81%. The coefficient Eta² estimates the importance or 
consistency of classification and allows us to choose the solution with the 
lowest number of groups and a good internal validity (equality: 
F(5,37)=32,7, p<.001, η²=0.815; economic liberty: F(5,37)=17,7, p<.001, 
η²=0.706; familial solidarity: F(5,37)=30,4, p<.001, η²=0.804). 
We used standardised profiles mean scores to compare the values 
scores by country groups (Appendix 1). The characterisation of social 
cohesion was taken into account using the following rules: if the absolute 
value of the mean z score is lower than or equal to 0.5, the value is 
considered as determining the cluster at a low level and is taken into 
account for the interpretation. The next thresholds are |0.5|<z≤|1| for a high 




Based on the values of equality, economic liberty and familial 
solidarity, we identified six social cohesion regimes (Table 4). 
Group 1. Familial, liberal and non-egalitarian: group 1 shows high 
scores for economic liberty and familial solidarity and a low score for 
equality. It consists of eight countries; most are in Eastern Europe and half 
are EU members. There are three post-communist countries (Bulgaria, 
Slovenia and Slovakia), two countries in development (Romania and 
Georgia), one post-soviet country (Belarus), one liberal country (Malta) and 
one country from the western Balkans (Albania).  
Group 2. Non liberal: this group shows a depreciation of economic 
liberty (low score) and no significant scores for equality and familial 
solidarity. It is the largest group, with fourteen countries all located in 
Southern or Eastern Europe, and six of which are EU members. There are 
five post-soviet countries (Armenia, Estonia, Latvia, Russia, and Ukraine), 
four out of six southern welfare regimes (Cyprus, Northern Cyprus, Spain, 
and Greece), three out of seven post-communist countries (Croatia, 
Hungary, and Poland), one country in development (Moldova), and one 
country from the western Balkans (Serbia).  
TABLE 4.  
[here] 
 
Group 3. Liberal non familial: group 3 shows low scores for equality, 
high scores for economic liberty and very low scores for familial solidarity. It 
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consists of nine EU countries with the exception of Norway. It groups four 
out of five Scandinavian countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden), two out of four liberal welfare regimes (Great Britain, Ireland), two 
out of seven corporatist welfare regimes (Austria, The Netherlands) and one 
post-soviet country (Lithuania).  
Group 4. Familial: this group shows a very strong depreciation of 
equality as well as economic liberty and a high appreciation for familial 
solidarity. It is the smallest group, composed of three countries all belonging 
to the former Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia) 
and all candidates or potential candidates to European membership.  
Group 5. Egalitarian familial: group 5 shows a very high valorisation 
of equality, a high valorisation of familial solidarity and no significant score 
for economic liberty. It is composed of four EU countries, two are corporatist 
welfare regimes (Belgium, France) and two are Mediterranean regimes 
(Italy and Portugal).  
Group 6. Egalitarian, liberal and non-familial: this group expresses a 
very high valorisation of equality, a high valorisation of economic liberty, and 
a low score for familial solidarity. It consists of five countries. Three are 
corporatist welfare regimes (Germany, Luxembourg, and Switzerland), one 
is a social democratic regime (Iceland) and one is a post-communist country 
(Czech Republic).  
This social cohesion regimes typology distinguishes European 
countries on an East-West axis and, to a certain extent, a North-South axis. 
However, it remains difficult to identify the welfare regimes proposed by 
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Bernard (1999). With reference to welfare regimes typologies, we observe 
that two liberal countries (Great Britain and Ireland) and four social-
democrat countries (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden) are included 
in the same liberal non-family cluster (3). On the other hand, corporatist 
countries are split between three models, the liberal, non-familial (3) (Austria 
and The Netherlands), the egalitarian, familial (5) (Belgium and France) and 
the egalitarian, liberal, and non-familial model (6) (Germany, Luxembourg, 
Switzerland). Countries belonging to Mediterranean welfare regimes are 
split between the non-liberal model (2) (Cyprus, Northern Cyprus, Spain and 
Greece) and the egalitarian, familial model (5) (Italy and Portugal).  
Eastern and Central European countries fall into different groups. It is 
not really possible to identify post-communist, post-soviet regimes and in-
development regimes as described by Fenger (2007). On the one hand, we 
observe that the countries of former Yugoslavia fall into three different 
groups: Albania and Slovenia belong to the group of familial, liberal and non-
egalitarian countries (1), Croatia and Serbia belong to the group of non-
liberal countries (2), while Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro, and 
Macedonia form the group of familial countries (4). On the other hand, there 
is no empirical evidence for strong egalitarianism: all ECE countries belong 
to groups which are neutral towards equality or to groups which express a 
low or very low valorisation of equality, with the exception of the Czech 
Republic. In fact, we observe that the Slovak Republic belongs to the 
familial, liberal and non-egalitarian group (1) whereas the Czech Republic 
belongs to the egalitarian, liberal and non-familial one (6) (as mentioned by 
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Kitschelt (2003), the Czech Republic displayed a rapid process of economic 
reforms towards liberalisation). Some authors state that the classification in 
Eastern and Central Europe is far too simple and does not express the 
diversity of the post-communist regimes when taking into account 
contextual elements (Ekiert and Hanson 2003; Kitschelt 2003). Our results 
are in line with this statement and require further research to identify causal 
mechanisms, which is beyond the scope of this work. The fact that East-
Central European (ECE) countries express basic values which are very 
different from each other confirms that they shaped their welfare culture 
before the “socialist dictatorship” (Ferge 2008; Inglot 2009). In a recent past, 
since the 1990s, they have also experienced different mechanisms of 
institutional change (Cerami 2009; Cook 2010). As changes are still going 
on, the current classifications of ECE countries can only be considered as 
temporarily valid. 
 
5. Conclusions and discussion 
We succeeded in measuring the values of liberty, equality, and solidarity 
which are the foundations of social cohesion as expressed in Bernard’s 
theory. Following the facet approach of Levy and Guttmann (1985) we 
identified appropriate items in the questionnaire EVS 2008 for 43 countries. 
Using the PCA method we identified three components and tested for 
construct validity with MDS. At a final stage, we proceeded with a 
hierarchical analysis classification to create a typology of social cohesion 
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regimes. We obtained six groups of countries which differ largely from each 
other, expressing different combinations of the perceptions of economic 
liberty, equality, and familial solidarity. Our typology fulfils the criteria of 
validity as described by Van Kersbergen (2013: 142): it is exhaustive and 
mutually exclusive. It identifies patterns and allows the classification of 
states with respect to their current ideology. It is a powerful tool for 
comparing current principles with the original basic values of the welfare 
states. 
By identifying social cohesion regimes based on support for universal 
values, we contribute to two main debates. We validate the central intuition 
of Bernard, that the three universal values are simultaneously necessary 
and at the same time in opposition as three types of interrelations.  
This is a first step in the contribution to identifying the relationship 
between social cohesion regimes and welfare regimes. From a policy 
perspective, taking such national ideational features into account would help 
policy choice. If we consider, for example, that Greece belongs to the group 
of countries that is characterised by only one feature, namely the negative 
support for economic liberty, then this result contributes to explaining the 
large public mobilisation again the austerity plans that the country has faced 
in the last years. Too large a gap between democratic values supported at 
the individual level and values that are conveyed at national or 
supranational levels by institutions such as the state, or supranational 
organisations such as the market, appear to threaten social cohesion.  
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We have shown that universal values may be used to identify 
different ideologies and that these ideologies allow to create different 
clusters of countries. We discovered that the configurations of universal 
values allows for the grouping of countries with different recent histories or 
countries usually grouped in different clusters when considering 
macroeconomic indicators (GDP, social expenditures, rate of 
un/employment…). This grouping may appear as “counterintuitive” as it 
differs from those based on the usual macro-level indicators. It reveals, in 
fact, that nations may share common patterns of universal values even if 
they have experienced divergent paths towards economic development and 
a different political history.  
 Some countries share a common type of social cohesion, or a 
common architecture as regards the relations between values, but their 
respective welfare regimes are classified according to different types. 
Denmark and Great Britain share the same cluster of social cohesion 
regimes when they are categorised as social democratic and liberal welfare 
states. The value of economic freedom as well as individual responsibility is 
highly supported but then there is no agreement on how to reach this ideal 
or how to translate this objective into concrete steps. This social cohesion 
typology overlaps neither with those of welfare regimes developed on the 
basis of Esping-Andersen’s one (1990) nor with previous groupings of social 
cohesion regimes (Green et al. 2009). This specific classification of 
countries shows new evidences, raises questions, from which in turn a 
number of hypothesis emerge.  
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This pleads in favour of a further step, namely taking into 
consideration attitudes and behaviours simultaneously with values when 
measuring social cohesion. Citing Thurow (1996: 158-9), Bernard points out 
that the values of democracy or capitalism do not represent a unifying 
ideology. It is therefore necessary to consider the concrete dimensions of 
social cohesion and these are manifested when mobilising not just values 
but attitudes and behaviours simultaneously with values.    
Secondly, Bernard considers equality as “a key dimension of social 
democratic order” (1999: 57), and argues that equality is linked to liberty 
and solidarity in a dialectical relationship. In this sense, social cohesion is 
intimately connected to the principle of social justice. Unfortunately, the use 
of EVS 2008 offers a restricted possibility for measuring equality. Our 
analysis measured unconditional equality with one single item and it is 
generally admitted that the use of one single item to identify a theoretical 
concept should be interpreted with caution, as it can lead to different 
conclusions, as observed by Han et al. (2012: 45) when comparing the 
results obtained by Arts and Gelissen (2001) and Green et al. (2009) in 
measuring meritocratic beliefs. This speaks in favour of developing the 
measurement of equality by introducing further questions related to this 
topic in the questionnaires prepared for the next waves of EVS. 
On the other hand, the attempt to measure the principle of equality 
faces some difficulties linked to the interaction between values and 
institutions. Green et al. suggest that countries in which institutions show a 
high valorisation of any value appear to take it for granted and therefore fail 
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to mention it in their preferences. This could explain why Nordic countries 
show a low support for equality.  
This argument is not complete without the observation of the 
existence of a comprehensive shift to greater liberalism and the pre-
eminence given to liberal rules. This again may be part of the explanation 
for the high valorisation we observe for the dimension of liberty, even in 
Nordic countries. Another hypothesis would be that individuals express 
support for the original principle that underpin welfare states. As the UK and 
Nordic countries have developed their welfare state on the Beveridgean 
model, we find support for the dimension of economic liberty and individual 
responsibility. From a theoretical point of view, it is also interesting to 
observe that support for economic liberty does not exclude support for 
equality (group 6). This calls for further research on the link between these 
two main dimensions. 
Following the work by Danforth and our results, we may conclude 
that there is no empirical evidence that the welfare typology is still congruent 
with current social policy. Finally, with exception of the Czech Republic, we 
observe that most of the post-communist and post-soviet countries share 
the common feature of anti-liberal values, even if they belong to two different 
clusters. 
Beckfield (2013) asked, when he observed a welfare ‘retrenchment: 
a general reduction in the generosity of popular welfare programs’ and a 
‘welfare convergence’ in the context of European integration: ‘the diminution 
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of differences among welfare states’ (p. 98), whether this meant “the End of 
equality in Europe?”. This development currently does not receive support 
from most of the Eastern and Central European countries, something which 
clearly reveals negative support for the principle of economic liberty but at 
the same time very different levels of support for the principle of equality. 
How will this evolve?  
From a wider perspective, some authors also claim that European 
social models are converging under the pressure of economic European 
integration (Beckfield 2013). On the contrary, some others think that specific 
differences will still be marked as welfare states remain nation-states: 
“These nation-states will still successfully claim the allegiance of most 
citizens and can make them go to war, pay taxes and social security 
contributions, and obey laws” (Arts 2002: 32). Furthermore, the same 
reasons behind social order that motivated its founders are still applicable. 
The question is that of the development of the balance between the three 
main principles, and particularly the level of acceptance of inequality under 
the influence of European social policy.  
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